“Give us the tools, and we will finish the job.”

About a year ago I read a blog post from Ben Horowitz, cofounder and General Partner of the venture capital firm Andreessen Horowitz, entitled “Peacetime CEO/Wartime CEO.”  The basic idea proposed by Horowitz is that an organization in peacetime has a large advantage versus the competition in its core market, and an organization in wartime is fending off an imminent existential threat; in both cases, there is a best-suited style of leadership for each.  I’ve thought repeatedly about the topic since I first read the post, and wonder: is the key challenge we face in moving ahead in human spaceflight one of having the wrong kind of political and executive leadership in place right now?

Because my focus is on Government-led human spaceflight, I’ll recast the peacetime/wartime definitions of Horowitz into ones more appropriate for the public sector.  They are:

• Peacetime – public sector organization receives broad policy and funding support from stakeholders, and delivers unquestioned value to the public.
• Wartime – public sector organization is fending off an immediate threat in terms of policy and/or funding support, or whose relevance to the public is openly questioned.

With these definitions, Government-led human spaceflight is in wartime.  Does that mean that Government should “go to war” against the perceived threats?  Absolutely.

The problem is in defining “the perceived threats.”  As I see it, the perceived threat is not the emerging commercial space sector.  The public sector is not in competition against the private sector for the right of providing access to low Earth orbit, despite the desire of certain entrenched interests to cast it as such.  In fact, the public sector is obligated to assist the private sector, both as a matter of policy (The National Space Policy of 2010) and of law (The NASA Authorization Act of 2010).  NASA has embraced this aspect of commercial development with its cargo resupply services contracts and ongoing Space Act Agreements for the development of a commercial crew transportation service.

Where I see the threats are in those areas exactly stated in the definition: policy and funding.  I believe where the policy and funding situation leads to a wartime setting is in the implementation details, by the attempt to recreate the glories of the past (first under the Constellation Program, now under the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle and Space Launch System) instead of building a sustainable space architecture.  My fear is that the current policy implementation is unlikely to be sustainable under reasonable projections of future budget allocations, between the threats of sequestration and the growing demands of mandatory spending on the federal budget.  If my fears are true, the President and the Congress will need to make a hard choice between allocating funding to match the policy implementation (unlikely), or directing changes in the policy implementation (more likely).

Such a demand bucks against the typical “peacetime” trend of setting policy and budgets based upon historical precedent, usually through slight modifications to existing policy or adjusting the budget slightly to match inflation, and using standard approaches (read “pork-barrel” politics) to influence implementation.  Such has been the trend in human spaceflight for decades.

No, it takes a different kind of leadership to affect major changes in policy and/or funding.  Most of the characteristics that Mr. Horowitz identifies for the wartime leaderhip are tough sells for the public sector, yet I see it as the spirit identified by the list rather than the actual characteristics that define the kind of leadership needed right now in human spaceflight: hands-on, detail oriented, quick-acting, single-minded, and focused on what it takes to win.

(As for relevancy, I made a case last year for defining the reasons for human spaceflight in terms of five value propositions.  Rather than rehash that examination, I offer that relevancy follows from rational conversations around those VPs.)

I’ll leave it as an exercise for you to decide if the political and executive leadership fits these qualities, or not.  There is an election later this year, which affords us the opportunity to show with our votes whether we believe our political and executive leadership capable of wartime execution with regards to human spaceflight, or not.

You decide.

Text © 2012, Joe Williams.  All rights reserved.
Photo credit: “Construction 09 4” by Andy Brooks via FotoPlanet, used under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike license.

“A goal without a plan is just a wish.”

Late last week, the leadership team at the NASA Johnson Space Center released the 2012 NASA-JSC Strategic Implementation Plan.  The Plan ties to the Agency-level strategic plan released last year and focuses on JSC’s strength: leading human space exploration.  In the coming weeks we’ll be discussing internally how our respective organizations will work to reach those goals.

The last piece is for each of us to examine our respective roles in implementing this plan.  So, to that end, I’m going to do a very public examination of my current role at NASA-JSC and how it fits into the Plan, for the whole world to see.  (Well, at least that tiny sliver of the world that reads this blog.)  First, the Plan:

2012 NASA-JSC Strategic Implementation Plan

Vision – Declaration of our future:

JSC leads a global enterprise in human space exploration that is sustainable, affordable, and benefits all humankind.

Mission – Our value proposition:

JSC provides and applies the preeminent capabilities to develop, operate, and integrate human exploration missions spanning commercial, academic, international, and US government partners.

Goals – Overarching targets to achieve our mission and vision

1. Lead Human Exploration

2. Lead Internationally

3. Excel in Leadership, Management, and Innovation

4. Expand Relevance to Life on Earth

Goal #1: Lead Human Exploration

Strategy 1.1 Exploit the ISS as a cornerstone of human exploration

Success Factors:

•            Ensure utilization of ISS as a premier scientific research laboratory

•            Promote ISS as an exploration technology development test bed

•            Safely operate ISS through at least 2020 as a cornerstone of LEO operations

Strategy 1.2 Enable the commercialization of LEO

Success Factors:

•            Enable the success of commercial partners by providing technical expertise, ISS domain knowledge, facility usage, and serving as a key customer for services

•            Support the development of additional commercial opportunities in space such as satellite servicing, orbital debris removal, expanded access, and R&D platforms

Strategy 1.3 Extend human exploration beyond LEO

Success Factors:

•            Lead development of space exploration systems and vehicles by applying our unique capabilities

•            Expand and apply mission planning and operation expertise beyond LEO

•            Understand and mitigate human health and performance risks to enable extended exploration beyond LEO

•            Lead maturation of human exploration technologies

•            Support development of human rated launch systems

•            Develop knowledge of exploration destinations to enable future missions of discovery

Goal #2: Lead Internationally

Strategy 2.1 Leverage ISS experience to lead international community participation in human space exploration

Success Factors:

•            Expand existing relationships to formulate exploration concepts

•            Promote international utilization of ISS as an exploration technology test bed

Strategy 2.2 Guide development of Agency Global Exploration Roadmap

Success Factors:

•            Apply unique JSC international experience to Agency global exploration roadmap effort

•            Lead definition of key interfaces and protocols

•            Define key architecture concepts and elements

Strategy 2.3 Champion international participation in the development of exploration capabilities

Success Factors:

•            Pursue international collaborations on exploration technologies development

•            Pursue mutually beneficial international contributions to exploration mission

Goal #3: Excel in Leadership, Management, and Innovation

Strategy 3.1 Lead through innovative technical and business management practices

Success Factors:

•            Aggressively pursue innovative technical and business approaches that drive affordability, sustainability, and accountability

•            Develop a customer-focused approach, streamlining policies, processes, and requirements such as agreements, pricing, and intellectual property to meet internal/external stakeholder needs

•            Promote the development of business acumen and situational awareness

•            Develop and implement an investment plan that provides critical capabilities while reducing infrastructure costs and meeting green technology goals

•            Emphasize life-cycle affordability and risk-informed decision processes in Program / Project management

Strategy 3.2 Lead by fully engaging the human spaceflight team

Success Factors:

•            Attract creative and talented individuals by creating an environment that is open minded and values different perspectives

•            Retain and cultivate critical skills that align with goals and business practices

•            Partner with other NASA centers, government, academia, industry and international community to achieve human spaceflight goals

Goal #4: Expand Relevance to Life on Earth

Strategy 4.1 Intertwine JSC in mutually beneficial partnerships to maximize economic and societal impact

Success Factors:

•            Expand collaborative development with other centers, agencies, industries, international partners, and academia, particularly in the areas of Aerospace, Medicine, Energy, and Transportation

•            Maximize technology transfer to, and technology solutions from, commercial applications for economic benefit

•            Collaborate with academia and research institutions and utilize open sources for development of multi-use technologies, and promote two-way exchange of knowledge

•            Engage intermediaries to enable utilization of facilities and expertise, and foster collaborative development with external entities

Strategy 4.2 Inform, educate and engage all generations to advance human space exploration

Success Factors:

•            Engage the public, stakeholders, and media to participate in our missions by increasing access to accomplishments and activities

•            Deliver compelling information, programs, and activities for students and teachers that promote STEM education

•            Target products and outreach efforts in ways that reach key audiences and stakeholders such as using social media and other advanced bi-lateral information technology

Strategy 4.3 Strategically communicate JSC’s relevance in terms meaningful to our stakeholders

Success Factors:

•            Develop a compelling narrative of JSC’s relevance in economic and societal terms

•            Enable all JSC team members to be ambassadors communicating JSC messages

•            Ensure communication activities support all four JSC goals

Where do I fit in?

My primary work is leading strategies for how we acquire the goods and services needed for human spaceflight in the areas of Mission Control, astronaut training, mission planning systems, and the teams of supporting contractor personnel needed to execute the work.  I’m very much driven by strategy 3.1, Lead through innovative technical and business management practices, by aggressively pursuing business approaches that drive affordability, sustainability, and accountability, and by pursuing approaches that provide critical capabilities while reducing infrastructure costs.  I’m also driven by strategy 3.2, Lead by fully engaging the human spaceflight team, since I seek to attract creative and talented individuals to my teams by creating an environment that is open minded and values different perspectives.  Finally, I’m driven by strategy 4.1, Intertwine JSC in mutually beneficial partnerships to maximize economic and societal impact, which happens to be a key objective in each of the strategies I’ve led recently; I believe firmly in the concepts of bringing the best the commercial sector has to offer, even if it challenges conventional wisdom and the status quo.

All of the above work is in support of Goal #1, Lead Human Exploration.  Finally, I see this blog as being an informal avenue towards supporting strategy 4.2, Inform, educate and engage all generations to advance human space exploration, and strategy 4.3, Strategically communicate JSC’s relevance in terms meaningful to our stakeholders.  By sharing my experiences in building and leading high performance teams in the context of human spaceflight. I hope I’m sharing a light on what it’s like to work inside a large Government bureaucracy that is seeking to respond to its environment.  Additionally, I see the potential indirect benefits of engaging you, the reading public, on matters of direct interest to me in human spaceflight, so that we both might benefit.

Text (except quote) Copyright © 2012 Joe Williams
Photo credit: iStockphoto/courtneyk

Here’s an excerpt:

The concert hall at the Syndey Opera House holds 2,700 people. This blog was viewed about 9,000 times in 2011. If it were a concert at Sydney Opera House, it would take about 3 sold-out performances for that many people to see it.

Click here to see the complete report.

As 2011 draws to a close, I’m very pleased to celebrate three years of postings on Leading Space.  These three years have borne witness to a number of changes in human spaceflight, some very fundamental.  Along the way I’ve written about my role in my tiny corner of the human spaceflight world, and also commented on space policy matters and the associated leadership (or lack thereof) coming from Capitol Hill and the White House.  In any case, a number of postings here on Leading Space have gained traction with you, the reading audience, for which I thank you.  You make Leading Space what it is, and it wouldn’t be it without you.  Today’s retrospective will look back at 2011 viewed through those postings, and conclude with a brief look ahead to 2012.

The most popular topic on Leading Space is – no surprise – change.  In particular, the most frequently viewed post is one that I wrote two years ago this month: Transactional, Transitional, and Transformational Change.  That post foreshadowed the policy shift in human spaceflight that happened two months later, with the cancelation of the Constellation Program and the handing over of routine access to low Earth orbit to the private sector.  The aforementioned post was written in a broad sense.  Subsequent posts focused on details of human spaceflight changes in the context of the change model introduced in that post.  I’ve given a lot of further thought to this particular view of change.  In the future I see making a stronger unification of it with Michael Watkins’s STaRS model, especially between transitional change and the Realignment state in STaRS.  Recalling a conversation I had last month with Dr. Howard Prince at the University of Texas, I would also like to bring some of his ideas on leadership to this model as well.

Another popular topic is teamwork.  Here, posts such as Team Charter (written earlier this year) and Building and Leading Teams Through Conation and the Kolbe Model (written about two years ago) are frequently visited posts.  The topic of leading high performance teams is of great interest to me, and I’m pleased that others share my interests enough to make this topic a popular one.  I’m continuing to refine and evolve my view of leading teams through theory and practical application, and I’ll continue to share my experiences with both on Leading Space in 2012.  It is likely I will be forming another team in the coming year to revisit the strategies for purchasing goods and services for Mission Control, astronaut training, planning systems, and the people who perform the work.  To the extent that I can share my experiences, I will do so.

Another frequently-viewed topic is the series I wrote earlier this year on Human Spaceflight Directions.  This six-part series was motivated in part by a conversation I had with Mary Lynne Dittmar and a series she is writing on the value propositions of human spaceflight.  I also wrote the series to prepare for a talk with the North Houston Astronomy Club on the future of human spaceflight.  As I see it, much of the conversation concerning the value of human spaceflight is muddled in unclear values or values not supported by the instruments of policy and budgets.  If we wish to align the human spaceflight value proposition with our own values, I see a strong need for us to be clear and persistent in those conversations with each other and with our elected officials.  Hopefully, this series will serve as an example and a starting point for those conversations.

I hope you enjoyed this retrospective and are looking forward to a brighter future in 2012.  Happy holidays!

“In life and business, there are two cardinal sins. The first is to act precipitously without thought and the second is to not act at all.”

Earlier this week NASA announced that we have inked a deal with a petroleum training services company to use the pool at the Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory. (And no, it’s not quite “Armageddon”.) I call this a “step towards the future.” Why? To explain let me share with you a bit of how we got to this point, and where this might lead.

About three years ago I was tasked with leading a team to devise a procurement strategy for the operations at the Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory and its sister facility, the Space Vehicle Mockup Facility. At that time, we had three major human spaceflight programs: the Shuttle Program was still underway with a couple of years of flight remaining, the International Space Station Program was working towards completion of assembly of the orbital laboratory, and the Constellation Program to return us to the Moon and go to Mars was ramping up. We knew that retirement of the shuttle was coming soon, ISS would be transitioning from assembly to operations, and Constellation did not have a big demand for the resources of the aforementioned facilities, except for some mockups and limited training needs. In essence we were looking at a future with only one “anchor tenant” – the ISS – and a distinct possibility of underutilized facilities but with fixed costs that would have to be carried by one program versus two. We needed to do something.

The leadership in mission operations gave me a clear charter – find a way to reduce the “O&M” (operations and maintenance) cost of the two facilities to the human spaceflight programs by bringing in external customers who might be able to take advantage of the unique capabilities offered by these facilities, while maintaining the superb safety record at the facilities. The team and I made this a central item of our procurement strategy – how to devise an operations contract that would have as one of its components an approach to identifying markets, recruiting potential customers, and getting them inside the facilities for reimbursable business.

We faced some clear challenges. How do we attract reimbursable business into a Government-owned facility? How do we navigate the byzantine Government regulations without overburdening commercial businesses? How do we find a balance between Government and commercial needs? Any of these could be insurmountable problems, if we let them be.

Instead, the team chose to focus on the solution, not the problem. We saw that we could structure a competitive procurement for the operations of the facilities and use that as the means to navigate these problems while keeping the end goal of reducing O&M costs in sight. The competitive procurement had as one of its central strategies a solicitation for a plan for identifying, vetting, and clearing a prospective commercial customer to use one or both facilities. Additionally, we tied a percentage of the “award fee” to be paid to the contractor based on its performance relative to its proposed plan. In the background, we worked with safety, medical, and legal personnel to streamline and simplify the regulations. Finally, we secured commitments that would assure commercial customer access while maintaining our commitments to our human spaceflight program customers. A number of people worked hard behind the scenes to bring all of the above to fruition, and executives at the Johnson Space Center and at NASA Headquarters in Washington, DC gave us the approval to proceed. It’s in no small part due to the efforts of all involved that the strategy was put into place.

This week’s announcement demonstrates that it is possible to utilize a world-class Government facility with a highly skilled and unique workforce in a way that is attractive to commercial businesses. Understand that this is no small matter. In many instances, Government facilities and services tend to be unnatural monopolies and thus are susceptible to inefficiencies that can be exposed by the commercial market. Here, we’ve demonstrated that it is possible to iron out those inefficiencies in a way that brings value to the commercial market.

Where might this lead? Where I’ve been focusing my time since the above was completed is in other areas of mission operations where we have world-class facilities with highly skilled and unique workforces that might bring value to the commercial market. Imagine if the emerging commercial space transportation market might see value in a similar approach. Obviously, an emerging commercial space company might see its bottom line better served by having everything vertically integrated in house, such as the approach being taken by SpaceX. However, others might see it differently and could envision value being created by seeking public-private partnerships with the Government for facilities and services that the Government might offer at attractive market rates. I’m working on other contract strategies that keep this possibility in mind, to ensure that those future contracts are enablers rather than obstacles to creating and realizing this value.

I hope this gives you a glimpse behind the scenes in a way that shows that the Government is not just an entrenched bureaucracy only interested in protecting the status quo. There are others like me who are working behind the scenes to get the best bang out of your tax dollars, often in ways that challenge the standard way of doing business, yet does so in a way that both creates value as well as to move us ahead in human space exploration.

Those who expect moments of change to be comfortable and free of conflict have not learned their history.
–Joan Wallach Scott

Based on the tracking metrics of visitors to LeadingSpace, the most popular topic is transactional, transitional, and transformational change. I first wrote about this view of change two years ago through the lens of human spaceflight policy at the national level. At that time (this was late 2009), rumors were circulating that there would be changes to the flagship human spaceflight program of the future – the Constellation Program – resulting from the just concluded activities of the Augustine committee chartered by the current White House administration.  Little did I know at that time, nor did most people in the human spaceflight community, the depth of the changes to come:  the outright cancellation of the program, which lead to the shaking of the foundation of policy and purpose of human spaceflight.  As I’ve written several times since, the technical and political leadership took some missteps in the execution of a change of that magnitude, the consequences of which are still with us today. I still believe that.  However, today I’d like to shift to a positive focus, and to a different level within human spaceflight, to cite some examples from an organization that is managing transitional change successfully, and why.

As a reminder, on the spectrum of transactional, transitional, and transformational change, transitional change arises when one of two different situations occurs.  The first way to transitional change is through the accumulation of so many smaller and simpler transactional changes that the effects begin to spillover into noticeable alterations in the organization, processes, or workforce skills necessary to enact the change successfully. Much as in a state transition, add or remove enough heat and a liquid turns to solid, or a gas. Another way for a transitional change to arise in the case where the scope of change is rather simple or the number of changes is small, yet the outcome resulting from the change is unpredictable.

How is transitional change done right?  It’s a matter of pursuing three critical components aggressively: offense and defense, culture, and stakeholders.

Offense and Defense.  The particular organization I have in mind is at NASA and is facing a big change with respect to its traditional role in human spaceflight.  With the retirement of the Shuttle and cancellation of Constellation, the remaining work of this organization is in support of the International Space Station.  The defensive side says to devote the right amount of energy to continue to excel at the support of existing work.  Yet this must be balanced against careful crafting and execution of a new offensive plan.  For the organization in mind, this means breaking away from 100% reliance upon direct support to Government-led human spaceflight and instead building partnerships with the emerging commercial space sector.  This is one of those transitional-class changes that is simple to cite, yet may be unpredictable in what it means to the future of the organization.  However, as long as the organization is true to its mission, guiding principles, and value propositions, the outcome will be very favorable.

Culture.  Understanding the good and bad aspects of the organization’s culture is important for navigating a transitional change successfully.  The organization in mind has a very strong “can-do” spirit codified in a set of guiding principles, and it has significant pockets of strength within it.  Furthermore, the vast majority of people in the organization want to continue to see themselves as successful in the business of human spaceflight.  Recognition of the determination and strength as positive attributes of the culture is imperative so that these are preserved and nurtured through the transition.  Yet not all culture is necessarily good, or else the organization would not find itself needing to undergo a transitional change.  A key step is to identify those deeply ingrained cultural norms that no longer contribute to high performance.  For this organization, as is fairly common across NASA, it is the “not invented here” syndrome leading to custom in-house development or contracting with a “here is how to do it” mindset.  Because it’s an aspect of culture, it’s hard to change.  Yet the organization in mind is attempting steps towards challenging that cultural aspect by seeking commercial solutions with minimal to no tailoring for its infrastructure.  This has a two-fold payoff – lower costs to the Government, and makes the organization attractive to potential commercial partners on a cost basis (the technical aspects are already of the highest reputation).

Stakeholders.  Engaging in meaningful conversations with all stakeholders is a must for enacting a transitional change successfully.  This means addressing all factors that go into decisions in the public sector – technical, workforce, budgets, and politics – and to discuss early and repeatedly the value propositions of the organization relative to the stakeholders’ concerns.  For instance, the Administration, with the rollout of the 2010 President’s budget signaled a change in fundamental space policy, failed to engage in meaningful conversations with a key stakeholder – the Congress – until afterwards.  That was too late.  We’ve been living with the reverberations of that failure ever since.  To contrast, the organization in mind made a conscious effort to engage immediately in conversations with stakeholders at its local center as well as at NASA Headquarters, and has even had fruitful conversations with the emerging commercial space sector (who by virtue of potential public-private partnerships could become stakeholders as well).  So far, the conversations with stakeholders have been positive and have served as a key component for helping the organization move forward in enacting transitional change successfully to date.

If you gather it from what I’ve said above, it takes an extra level of leadership to enact a transitional change successfully.  Whether it is Netflix’s bungled steps recently with the handling of its DVD business, or the aforementioned space policy change, a lack of leadership acumen in how to navigate the proper level of change can reduce the likelihood of a successful outcome – or even spell disaster.

Text Copyright © 2011, Joe Williams
Photo credit: iStockphoto/frentusha

“Do not believe in anything simply because you have heard it. Do not believe in anything simply because it is spoken and rumored by many. Do not believe in anything simply because it is found written in your religious books. Do not believe in anything merely on the authority of your teachers and elders. Do not believe in traditions because they have been handed down for many generations. But after observation and analysis, when you find that anything agrees with reason and is conducive to the good and benefit of one and all, then accept it and live up to it.”
–Buddha

If you’ve been following space news recently, propellant depots are in the news again.  (If you’re not familiar with “propellant depots,” consider them as a “gas stations” in space – either in low Earth orbit or in other easily accessible locations in space.)  The latest news concerns the claim that NASA internal studies show that propellant depots provide a cheaper alternative to deep space exploration than that provided by the heavy lift options under consideration during the previous summer. I’m not going to address whether the reporting is accurate, or not (and I’m sure that comes to the disappointment of the propellant depot enthusiasts out there).  Instead, I’m going to use propellant depots to address something more fundamental that I hope has benefits beyond this particular arena – examination of my “thought bubbles.”

Let’s start with these statements.

• I have reservations about propellant depots. 
• Something about them doesn’t seem quite right. 

These statements reflect what is going on inside my head right now concerning propellant depots.  Does this internal dialogue represent my instincts talking to me?  In this case, I don’t think so; instead, this dialogue is representative of what Holly G. Green calls a “thought bubble.”  According to Ms. Green, a “thought bubble” is our inner voice telling us the world must be a certain way, because we are filling a void of information with our own interpretation and beliefs.

To move forward on my reservations concerning propellant depots requires the recognition that I have voids in my understanding about them.  Borrowing from the typical debate format, here are three ways to fill the voids, all of which are needed here.

Facts.  Facts are those items of knowledge or information based on real occurrences, something that actually exists, or something that is known to have existed or to have happened.  Some examples of facts: “Propellant depots in low Earth orbit do not exist today.”  “We have successfully built heavy lift launch vehicles in the past, such as Saturn V and Shuttle.”  “NASA’s top-line budget, when accounting for inflation, has remained essentially flat since 2000.”  The greatest challenge concerning facts is to consider all relevant facts in evidence, not just to “cherry pick” those that support a particular position while ignoring the others.

Value.  Discussions of value revolve around whether a thing is good or bad, worthy or unworthy, just or unjust.  The typical approach to objectifying value is to identify the benefits (real or perceived) and weigh them against the cost, using the value equation: value = benefit – cost.  Discussions around value can be challenging, such as when the benefit cannot be monetized as is often the case in public sector pursuits.  (In fact, this is one of the primary reasons why a given pursuit is done by the public sector versus the private sector.)  What one often resorts to in this case is an assumption of equivalent benefit and a comparison of costs; lower cost for equivalent benefit results in a greater value.  A comprehensive discussion of value needs to address as many realistic potential benefits as can be identified, along with an honest assessment of the likelihood of occurrence of each of those benefits.  This, in conjunction with cost estimates and cost uncertainty, form the foundation of a value conversation.

Policy/Law.  We also have a body of policy and law that must be taken into account.  In the case of space exploration, we have the top-level National Space Policy of 2010, created by the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the National Security Council, that establishes space policy for the Department of Defense, NASA and various intelligence agencies. We also have the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, passed by Congress as Public Law 111-267 with exclusive focus on NASA, that states the “will of Congress” in the form of law.

What I’ve outlined here is the approach I will take to address my thoughts bubbles concerning propellant depots.  In particular, I’ll conclude with a quick examination of the policy/law side, which appears on the surface to be the biggest obstacle to the propellant depot approach.

The National Space Policy of 2010 does not reference propellant depots explicitly, although one can make the case that propellant depots fit the definition of “supporting infrastructure” if deemed as part of a “mission-essential function.”  In my opinion, if a mission architecture was proposed and planned with propellant depots in mind, such an approach could fit conceptually within the policy.  The NASA Authorization Act of 2010 actually calls out “propellant resupply and transfer” as one of several findings identified by Congress for enabling humans to move beyond low Earth orbit.  The “Congressional language” mentioned in the report is a reference to the Space Launch System cited explicitly in the Authorization Act, and a mutually-understood position between Congress and NASA that the Space Launch System takes precedence over an architecture based on propellant depots.  Although I’ll admit the latter is conclusory, I see it following from the “Top Three Priorities for NASA” stated at the formal unveiling of the Space Launch System a few weeks ago:

1. Commercial cargo and crew for the International Space Station;
2. Deep space exploration with the Space Launch System and the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle; and
3. Completing the James Webb Space Telescope.

I don’t see propellant depots mentioned, so they aren’t a top priority for NASA.

Yet I offer that by attacking our thought bubbles and examining the facts, value, and policy/law, we might end up in a different position in a few years with regards to propellant depots.  So for the propellant depot enthusiasts out there, continue identifying relevant facts, refining your value proposition, and keep pushing for policy and law supportive of your approach.  You just might get there.

Text Copyright © 2011, Joe Williams
Photo credit: iStockphoto/4×6

“Mentor: Someone whose hindsight can become your foresight.”

Thanks to a blog post by Michael Hyatt, I’ve been working on my life plan.  In one sense, I’m approaching 50 and perhaps it’s time for me to decide “what I want to be when I grow up.”  In another, I’ve experienced that writing down a plan itself leads to a greater sense of commitment to the actions necessary to implement the plan successfully.  I rediscovered this sense of commitment recently on a particular topic in my life plan: mentoring.

I believe it good sense to surround ourselves with trusted advisors, coaches and mentors.  Each brings value to us in different ways.  My own framework of advisors, coaches, and mentors looks something like this:

• An Advisor offers insights along the lines of “research and experience have shown this to be the best way” or “you ought to take this into consideration.”
• A Coach asks the questions, “What have you tried? How has this worked? What else can you try?” as a means to identify barriers and to design strategies and actions to overcome them.
• A Mentor says “this is how I did it, and here’s how it turned out”, based on his/her direct experience and knowledge.

I’m active in the formal mentoring program at the Johnson Space Center, where I’ve served as a mentor several times and also as a protégé in past years.  As I reflected on my own experiences while working on my life plan, a question kept lingering in the back of my mind: what differentiates between a good mentor, and a not-so-good one?  Because I’m a value-driven person, it’s important to me that the mentoring relationship is one of mutual value.  Additionally, my personal core value of excellence has me inquiring and evaluating my own performance as a mentor, both to affirm that we’re getting value but also to identify any needed areas of improvement in my own performance.

Recently, I read a blog post by Amilya Antonetti that helped shed some light on the matter of excellence for me.  In it, Amilya says that a mentor goes beyond my description of a mentor, with a simple addition: mastery.  For me, that turned on a light bulb.  Therefore, as I prepare to seek out mentors to help me with implementing my life plan, I intend on seeking mentors with the following characteristics:

Compelling.  Seek a mentor with an interesting life story.  A compelling mentor is more apt for the protégé to keep the momentum going and for successful engagement in the mentoring partnership.

Communicative.  Communication is a two-way street.  Seek a mentor who can communicate in multiple ways – in person, over the phone, through email, whatever.  As a protégé, be ready to do the same.

Credibility.  Seek a mentor who can provide guidance based on his/her own experience and knowledge and has the demonstrated track record of mastery to go with it.

Comfort.  Above all, seek a mentor with whom you are comfortable.  Mentoring does require an open mind and a willingness to receive critical feedback as well as attempt actions outside one’s normal comfort zone.

I’ve reinitiated contact with one of my former mentors, who greatly influenced me with the career choices I’ve made in recent years.  I’m also compiling a list of other mentors who might be able to help me with my life plan.  I’m revved up and ready to go.

What do you look for in a mentor?

Text Copyright © 2011, Joe Williams
Photo credit: iStockphoto/stphillips

“Passion starts the journey and discipline guides around the curves.”

You remember the story of the trapped Chilean miners from last year?

Earlier this summer i saw a video clip of an interview conducted by Michael Useem, Director for the Center for Leadership and Change Management at the University of Pennsylvania (and author of a number of books such as Leading Up, which I happen to have on my bookshelf), with Laurence Golborne, a Chilean civil engineer, entrepreneur, and Chile’s Mining Minister.  What I found fascinating about the interview is the simplicity with which Golborne spoke about leading a team of specialists to conduct the rescue.  In particular, I noted several key attributes he mentioned concerning leadership:

• Sell the team on a dream: the idea that we can describe the outcome we are seeking – successful rescue of the miners – as what we are striving for.
• Never give up: although the challenges for conducting a rescue may appear insurmountable, positive optimism will win the day.
• Be present and seen as committed: being on site as opposed to behind a desk in Santiago brought forth a level of infectious commitment from all those involved in the rescue.
• Be surrounded by competent, confident people: having the previous three naturally draws competent, confident people like a magnet; a leader is only as good as the weakest link on the team.

When I reflected on these key attributes, I see a pattern of passion and discipline.  Moreover, these two words have cropped up numerous times in recent weeks.  Is there something going on here?

Kate Nasser thinks so.  In a recent blog post she wrote that it takes two traits to be successful – passion and discipline – as a duo.  Success does not come with one or the other.  It must be both.

I’ve reflected on passion and discipline as I look ahead to our future in human spaceflight (you knew this was coming, right?).  On Monday, NASA Administrator Charlie Bolden remarked during a visit here in Houston that the new Space Launch System will succeed because we will have a leaner, more disciplined NASA that will overcome the technical and budgetary challenges before us.  Much as in the Chilean mining rescue, some of these challenges are rather daunting.  With a growing federal deficit and increased pressure from some in Congress to cut spending, the budgetary challenges will be tremendous.  As Charlie pointed out, “we have to be affordable and we have to change the way we do business.”  All of this speaks towards discipline – technical and budgetary.

Where is the passion?

Look, if there is one characteristic in common with people when talking about space, it’s passion.  Just last week I gave a tour of the NASA facilities in Houston to a friend, and during the day I could see the passion in her eyes as the tour served as a catalyst for her own dreams of pursuing advanced degrees in astrophysics.  What is it the NASA Tweetup participants have in common, for choosing to come together?  Passion.

If the passion for the next step in human spaceflight is rooted in merely building giant rockets, then we are what some of our critics accuse us of being: yet another Government agency whose existence serves the special interests in certain Congressional districts. I don’t know about you, but my passion is not in building giant rockets, with all due respects to some of my esteemed NASA colleagues.

Instead, my passion is in exploring, in discovering and learning new things about the universe around us.  To explore, we have to have a reason why.  I’ve articulated five possible reasons why before: nationalism, commerce, science, saving the Earth, and settlement.  Any or all of these can serve as the motivating reason why.

To bring it home, we need a goal tied to the reason.  Some call this a “destination”, which is being frowned upon at the highest levels.  I don’t call it a destination, I call it a goal that unites passion and discipline in the kinds of ways Kate Nasser wrote about, and which Laurence Golborne spoke about.  For me, that goal is to return to the Moon, to stay.

Imagine the passion that would be ignited by such a goal (and no, Mr. President, it’s not a ‘been there done that” sort of thing).

Imagine the level of discipline needed to bring about such an outcome with the fiscal pressures upon us and the advancement in technology needed.

Wouldn’t uniting passion and discipline be the right thing to do for human spaceflight?

Copyright © 2011, Joe Williams
Photo credit: iStockphoto/sdecoret

“Life is all about timing… the unreachable becomes reachable, the unavailable become available, the unattainable… attainable. Have the patience, wait it out It’s all about timing.”
–Stacey Charter 

After several months of waiting, the Space Launch System was unveiled last week.  The Space Launch System, or SLS, will be designed to carry the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle, as well as important cargo, equipment and science experiments to Earth’s orbit and destinations beyond.  NASA Administrator Charlie Bolden said, “This launch system will create good-paying American jobs, ensure continued U.S. leadership in space, and inspire millions around the world.”

I’ve watched the unfolding of the SLS saga through the leadership lens I’ve been grinding over the last few years.  On one hand, I’m more than ready to do my part to push the boundaries of human exploration of space to new destinations.  However, it is not without some reservation that I view the current situation.  Here’s why.

From a change standpoint, the SLS as a successor to the Shuttle and Constellation programs represents a transactional change: the one-for-one swapping out of one large human spaceflight program for another.  From a leadership standpoint, the attractive aspects of pursuing a transactional change are that little to no modifications are needed to NASA’s organizational structure, to the existing system of policies and procedures, or to the individual skills and abilities needed to implement the change.  It’s an easier form of change to pursue, allowing the leadership to “ride” the status quo for the most part.  Sure, a new Program office will be created, existing contracts modified, new contracts awarded, and the current workforce redistributed.  Yet at the heart of it, the transactional change represented by the SLS is built upon a fundamental assumption: the outcome is simple and predictable, and using a big rocket program owned and operated by the Government will maintain the current state of human spaceflight.

I am somewhat concerned with the validity of this fundamental assumption.  In my view, the greatest destabilizing force to the predictability assumption is budgetary, as external fiscal pressures squeeze the availability of discretionary spending, and intra-Agency priorities compete internally for scarcer and scarcer resources.  We’ve already experienced that in recent years with the reallocation of funding inside NASA when Constellation was underfunded by the President and the Congress, and recent hints at a similar cannibalizing to save the James Webb Space Telescope do not help the fiscal situation.  The second destabilizing force is the shifting national priorities that will arise as we progress from a mono-polar world, where the United States is the lone superpower, to the rapidly rising multi-polar world where the BRIC countries – Brazil, Russia, India, and China – pursue their respective space interests.

With all that said, the SLS is the course charted by the President, the Congress, and NASA.  I have my concerns, yet those concerns do not prevent me from continuing to do my part to be a good steward of the American taxpayer’s dollars.  In my corner of the world, I will continue to find ways to optimize our investments in human spaceflight operations while building new partnerships with the emerging commercial space sector, to increase the likelihood of the success of human spaceflight in a fiscally responsible manner.

Text © 2011, Joe Williams.  All rights reserved.
Photo credit: NASA