China in Space

The final two paragraphs from the latest post from Paul Spudis’s blog regarding speculation that the next launch by China, Chang’E 3, will deliver a rover to the moon:

In any event, what does it say about American leadership in space that so many prefer to put their heads in the sand and ignore or deny this disquieting series of developments? It does not require either imminent or distant hostilities to recognize the possible dangers of having one power dominate such a vital field of endeavor – particularly a political power with a mixed record of sympathies to the western values of democracy and economic freedom.

Going to the Moon and developing cislunar space may not seem to be very important to some – it clearly isn’t to the current leadership of NASA. Prior to October 4, 1957, orbiting a satellite around the Earth wasn’t seen as very important either.

In recent weeks my Strategy class has discussed a number of tools for evaluating and developing strategy. In the above article are hints at what the U.S. has been doing wrong with regards to strategy in space. I’ll have more to say about this soon.
Update (September 8, 2014): Based on a term paper I wrote for the aforementioned Strategy class, I developed a series of posts that discusses elements of strategy that must be addressed if we are to have a meaningful, sustainable future for human space exploration.  Here are the links:


China in Space